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Medical Monitoring of Medical Devices:
An Industry-Based Solution Provides
the Best Results
By Ian Gallacher
The design, manufacturing, and sale of
implantable medical devices2 is a large and
growing industry in this country.3 Despite the
advances made in design and manufacturing
over the years, the medical device industry
inevitably experiences failure of at least some
of its products in any given line.4 The United
States Code requires manufacturers, physicians, and medical institutions to report product failures when they become known.5 When
failures become numerous, the products are
frequently recalled,6 either voluntarily by the
manufacturer, or pursuant to the FDA's regulatory power. 7 These recalls often occur in a
blaze of publicity, and are invariably a prelude
to mass litigation. 8
The combination of a high income industry, inevitable product failure, and high publicity recalls has created a target-rich environment
for the plaintiffs' bar. There are a number of
highly skilled attorneys, well armed with an
array of sophisticated legal weapons, who
make a lucrative practice of stalking the medical device industry and attacking companies
whose products have run into trouble. One of
the newer armaments available to such attorneys is a form of relief known as "medical
monitoring."
Medical monitoring can be defined as the
expense related to the periodic diagnostic
evaluation of an individual or group of individuals in order to detect and/or prevent an
anticipated medical outcome. It can also
include scientific research necessary to deter-
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mine the root cause of a particular product
failure, as well as, research exploring more
efficient methods of diagnosis. Medical monitoring does not typically include the cost of
treating the medical outcome if it emerges, or
the cost of medical or surgical intervention to
prevent the outcome.
Medical device medical monitoring litigation developed from cases involving exposure
to toxic substances. The first case to explicitly
permit recovery for medical monitoring is
generally considered to be Ayres v. Township of
Jackson9 . In this toxic exposure case, the New

Jersey Supreme Court permitted plaintiffs to
recover for medical monitoring even though
the plaintiffs had not demonstrated any physical injury from the toxic exposure. Although
Ayres is the first case to recognize a medical
monitoring remedy, earlier cases have recognized relief for diagnostic testing, not all of
10
them toxic exposure cases.
Medical monitoring suits are often brought
as class actions.11 Class actions permit the
aggregation of claims against the defendant
thereby increasing the efficiency of the medical monitoring effort 2 and arguably increasing
the attorney's fee. 13 Also, medical monitoring
is, at least facially, an appealing concept since
it introduces a means of preventing people
from becoming ill before they have to sue, and
provides them with diagnostic care at no
expense. Yet this facial appeal disguises a
myriad of legal and policy problems which
render court-ordered medical monitoring a less
appropriate mode of recovery in medical
device cases than an industry based solution
with FDA oversight.' 4
This article will review the public policy
concerns addressed by the toxic exposure cases
and discuss why an industry based initiative is
a more appropriate solution for dealing with
240 - Loyola Consumer Law Review

product failure of medical devices. This article
will also explore whether medical monitoring
is properly viewed in terms of legal damages or
equitable relief, and discuss how the nature of
the relief effects a defendant's right to a trial by
jury, and the type of class action which may be
certified under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition, this article will address
the legal problems which complicate and may
prevent medical monitoring relief, including
how the FDA's regulatory oversight role may
conflict with the doctrines of preemption and
separation of powers. Finally, this article will
explain why the most efficient and beneficial
method of resolving medical monitoring issues
is for the medical device industry to make
medical monitoring a part of device recall
programs.

I. The policy considerations implicated by medical device monitoring
support an industry based solution
rather than litigation
While medical monitoring might be an
appropriate remedy in toxic exposure litigation, the translation of this type of relief to the
medical device arena is an uneasy one. In
particular, certain policy considerations might
justify the imposition of court-ordered medical
monitoring relief in toxic exposure situations.
These public policy concerns are better addressed in medical device cases by keeping the
medical monitoring in the hands of the manufacturers of the devices, and combined with
regulatory oversight by the FDA.
Toxic exposure cases differ fundamentally
from medical device cases since toxic exposure
cases involve the unintended and involuntary
exposure to hazardous environmental agents.
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In specific, individuals exposed to toxic substances are most likely unaware of their exposure and would have no reason to seek diagnostic or preventative medical care, while an
individual who receives a medical device is
aware of possible complications that may result
from the implant. Further, the potential health
hazards resulting from exposure to toxic
substances have protracted latency periods.
Accordingly, courts have identified public
policy considerations which support the creation of court-ordered medical monitoring
relief in toxic exposure cases.15 Quoting from a
California Supreme Court case, the court in
Day v. NLO cited four public policy considerations supporting medical monitoring relief in
16
toxic exposure cases:
First, there is an important public
health interest in fostering access to
medical testing for individuals whose
exposure to toxic chemicals creates an
enhanced risk of disease, particularly in
light of early diagnosis and treatment for
many cancer patients.
Second, there is a deterrence value in
recognizing medical surveillance claims...
Third, "[t]he availability of a substantial
remedy before consequences of the
plaintiffs' exposure are manifest may also
have the beneficial effect of preventing or
mitigating serious future illness and thus
reduce the overall costs to the responsible
17
parties."'
Finally, societal notions of fairness and
elementary justice are better served by
allowing recovery of medical monitoring
costs. That is, it would be inequitable for
an individual wrongfully exposed to
dangerous toxins, but unable to prove that
cancer or disease is likely to have to pay
the expense of medical monitoring when
1998

such intervention is clearly reasonable and
necessary. 18
With the exception of the "deterrence"
factor 9 , the public policy considerations
identified by the courts are better addressed in
medical device cases within the context of a
voluntary program initiated by the device
manufacturer and regulated by the FDA.
Simply put, the medical device manufacturer
working in cooperation with the FDA can more
efficiently and quickly provide medical monitoring to affected individuals at no cost to the
individual.
An industry-based medical monitoring
program would combine the manufacturer's
knowledge of the device, and its ability to act
quickly to analyze the problems in a device,
with the regulatory oversight and enforcement
power of the FDA. Such an approach would
meet the immediate medical needs of the
affected individuals, and would involve less
expense to the industry. Moreover, an industrybased medical monitoring program would
reduce the transaction costs to manufacturers,
thus encouraging them to invest more resources in a voluntary monitoring program.
Furthermore, given the heavy economic
and time costs of litigation, both the public
health interest in early diagnosis and the
reduction of the overall costs to the responsible
parties are better protected by a voluntary
industry program regulated by the FDA. The
glacial pace of litigation in this area can mean
that plaintiffs might not obtain a medical
monitoring program, even by settlement, until
years after the discovery of the problem which
caused the litigation. The public policy concerns discussed by the courts, including fostering access to medical testing for the affected
individuals and the prevention or mitigation of
serious illness, are meaningless if they are not
Loyola University Chicago School ofLaw •241

achieved quickly enough to be of any benefit.
In addition, the collection and analysis of data
is a process which should begin immediately
upon the realization that a problem exists,
rather than waiting for a court order that could
be delayed for years. It is clearly in the patients' best interest for the manufacturer to
initiate a voluntary program of monitoringtype activities as soon as possible without
waiting for a court to order such activity.

as well, "Man is imperfect and therefore his
devices (may be) imperfect.". . . The manufacturer is responsible for postmarket surveillance; device failures may be random or systematic and the latter can only be determined
by analysis of performance trends. This may be
difficult if the failures are not time dependent
or are confined to only certain production lots.
Once a device problem is identified, the failure
rate, mechanisms, and possible associated
patient risk must be evaluated with the help of
II. NASPE promulgated a model
an expert panel convened by the manufacturer.
After recognition of a problem and its
guideline for managing medical demagnitude,
a notification process begins with
vice recalls
the identification of physicians, patients and
The North American Society of Pacing and hospitals, along with recommendations on
device disposition and patient management.
Electrophysiology ("NASPE"), a group of
Communication with regulators, physicians
physicians and pacing professionals, supports
and hospitals is essential as well as accountthe development of an industry-based medical
ability for all devices manufactured, with
monitoring program and has outlined a model
monitoring program for intracardic devices. In retrieval of nonimplanted devices. It is the
manufacturers' responsibility to ensure that the
a "NASPE Policy Statement," published in
recall process is complete and that physicians
1996, NASPE articulated guidelines for managing an intracardiac device recall.2 ° Although have been advised of clinical management
options. Problems with patient identification
aimed specifically at a narrow group of mediand device tracking arise when a recall device
cal devices, the NASPE article provides a
(e.g., a lead) is connected to a competitor's
model outline of how to manage all medical
device (e.g., a pulse generator). Cooperation
device recalls.
between manufacturers is essential, but may be
Although NASPE focuses on the responsiproblematic. recalls pose difficulties for the
bilities of each party to a recall, including the
patient, the hospital and the media, the analysis manufacturer because of these multiple responsibilities and pressures. The manufacturer also
of a manufacturer's responsibilities during a
faces significant costs, lost business, opportuproduct recall is particularly relevant and is
nistic actions of competitors, loss of a positive
worth quoting at length..
image in the physician community, and posA manufacturer's primary responsibility is
actions. 21
the design and manufacture of reliable and safe sible legal and regulatory
The NASPE article also sets forth the steps
devices. Preclinical testing, however, cannot
that a manufacturer should take to meet its
mimic the hostile environment of prolonged
obligations in a recall situation.
endovascular exposure. Regulatory oversight
1. Identification of a problem.
during premarket approval may be inadequate
2. Confirmation by a Physician Advisory
242 - Loyola Consumer Law Review
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Panel (PAC).
3. Classification of a recall.
4. Prompt notification to device regulatory
body or federal agency of all relevant
clinical and technical data, including
recommendations for management.
5. Provision of model and serial numbers of
all affected hardware to regulatory
agencies.
6. Direct registered mail notification to
National Pacemaker Registry, implanting
physicians, follow-up physicians, and
directors of pacemaker clinics.
7. Notification to competitors with a request
for identification of affected hardware
registered in their database.
8. Recommendations for management by
Physician Advisory Panel.
9. Provision of ongoing support: technical,
warranty, credit, financial (expenses not
covered by insurance), referrals to centers
of excellence (special problems), timely
updates on incidence, screening
techniques.
10. Request updates/feedback of relevant
information from affected pacemaker
clinics.

22

The NASPE recommendations provide an
outline for a paradigmatic medical monitoring
program which can be followed by every
manufacturer of a medical device. Adherence
to this outline, with the addition of FDA
oversight, would supply all the benefits of
court-ordered medical monitoring, but would
provide them years earlier than a court-ordered
program and at significantly less expense.
Further, NASPE's proposal adequately meets
the public policy goals outlined by the courts.
Understandably, the public may have
concerns about the independence of the program, and therefore its reliability. Two separate
1998

independent entities would have a role in the
management of a recall, including a Physician
Advisory Panel consisting of independent
experts with no incentive to provide cover for
the manufacturer, and the FDA, an organization which is in no way an apologist for the
medical device industry. The role of an independent Physician Advisory Panel and the
FDA should alleviate any public concerns over
the reliability of a voluntary program.
Not only is an industry based medical
monitoring program, as outlined above, the
most beneficial and efficient means of meeting
the needs of patients, it may also be the only
appropriate method of obtaining a medical
monitoring program. Judicially-imposed
medical monitoring obtained by means of
litigation is a form of relief which involves
significant and potentially insurmountable
legal obstacles.

Difficulties in determining
Il.
whether medical monitoring relief is
equitable or legal in nature and the
implications for the parties to a medical device suit
A court imposed medical monitoring
remedy has characteristics both legal
and equitable in nature. Whether medical
monitoring relief may be properly classified as
equitable relief or legal relief is a question with
serious implications for the parties of a medical device suit. The resolution of this question
affects issues as central as the right to a jury
trial and the type of class which a court may
certify.
Any consideration of the nature of a form
of relief must begin with an analysis of the
Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment
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provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where
the value exceeds twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved. 23 A suit in
common law is one in which legal rights alone
are asserted as opposed to those in which
equitable rights are asserted.24 The distinction
between legal and equitable remedies has been
maintained, even after the merger of law and
25
equity.
To determine whether a particular form of
relief is legal or equitable under the Seventh
Amendment, a court must go through a two
part test. First, the court must determine the
nature of the issues involved by comparing the
action being brought with like actions brought
in 18 th century England before the merger of
the courts of law and equity; and second, the
26
court must examine the remedy sought.

In order to determine the nature of the
claim when no such claim existed in 18th
century England, the court must look for an
analogous cause of action that did exist at that
time. 27 Medical monitoring did not exist as a
claim in 18th century England.28 In searching
for an analogous claim, the court in Barnes v.
Am. Tobacco Co. Inc. concluded that medical

monitoring is similar to a negligence action for
future medical expenses. Thus, the Barnes
court placed medical monitoring squarely in
the legal damages camp. 29 The court reached
this conclusion because under Pennsylvania
law, in order to recover for common law medical monitoring, a plaintiff must establish that
he was exposed to hazardous substances
30
because of the defendant's negligence.
Because negligence-based causes of action,
both in 18th century England and in the United
States today, are actions at law, the court
reasoned that it would be appropriate to conclude that a medical monitoring claim raises
31
primarily legal issues.
244 • Loyola Consumer Law Review

The Barnes court had greater difficulty
determining the nature of the remedy sought in
medical monitoring cases. The problem, as
explained by the court, is in determining what
the plaintiffs are truly seeking. If they seek
compensatory damages, then their request is
for money, and is legal in nature. If, on the
other hand, the plaintiffs "seek the establishment of a court-supervised medical monitoring
program through which the class members will
receive periodic examinations, then plaintiffs'
medical monitoring claim can be properly
characterized as [a] claim seeking injunctive
32
relief.
As the Barnes court noted, the distinction
33
between these two positions is a fine one.
The court relied on the analysis of Judge
Spiegel in the Day case:
Relief in the form of medical monitoring may be by a number of means. First, a
court may simply order a defendant to pay
a plaintiff a certain sum of money. The
plaintiff may or may not choose to use
that money to have his medical condition
monitored. Second, a court may order the
defendants to pay the plaintiffs' medical
expenses directly so that a plaintiff may
be monitored by the physician of his
choice. Neither of these forms of relief
constitute injunctive relief as required by
Rule 23(b)(2).
However, a court may also establish an
elaborate medical monitoring program of
its own, managed by court-appointed
court-supervised trustees, pursuant to
which a plaintiff is monitored by particular physicians and the medical data produced is utilized for group studies. In this
situation, a defendant, of course, would
finance the program as well as being
required by the Court to address issues as
Volume 10, number 3
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they develop during the program administration. Under these circumstances, the
relief constitutes injunctive relief as
34
required by Rule 23 (b)(2).

Accordingly, the Barnes court concluded
that, in the case before it, the plaintiffs' request
for medical monitoring relief seeking periodic
diagnostic examinations was "paradigmatic" of
injunctive relief under a medical monitoring
claim.35
Having therefore determined that the
nature of the medical monitoring relief depends on how the plaintiffs plead - a request
for money means that the relief is legal in
nature, whereas a request for a funded program
means that the relief is equitable - the Barnes
court then concluded that such a distinction
unfairly placed the defendants' right to a jury
trial in the hands of the plaintiffs. The court
based this conclusion on the long-standing
doctrine that a plaintiff cannot invoke the
powers of equity where there is an adequate
remedy at law available. 36 Because the court
had concluded that medical monitoring relief
was available as a matter of law, it was bound
to hold that, although possible to analyze
medical monitoring as either legal or equitable,
the action is a legal one for purposes of the
37
Seventh Amendment.
Just as the legal versus equitable nature of
medical monitoring in litigation presents
complicated legal questions of a defendant's
right to a trial by jury, the certification of a
medical monitoring class action is an equally
difficult question. So much so, that once again
the appropriateness of medical monitoring
litigation is brought into question.
Barnes again illustrates this point as the
court attempted to reconcile its previous
finding of medical monitoring as legal relief
for purposes of the Seventh Amendment with
1998

its certification of a Rule 23 (b)(2) class
action; an action that seeks injunctive or other
declaratory relief as opposed to monetary, legal
38
damages.
Under Rule 23(b)(2), certification is
appropriate where equitable and injunctive relief is the sole or primary relief
sought and 'does not extend to cases in
which the appropriate final relief relates
exclusively or predominantly to money
damages.'... Thus, in order to establish a
right to Rule 23(b)(2) certification, it need
only be shown that the relief requested is
not predominantly money damages. This
inquiry has nothing to do with whether
one's constitutional right to a jury trial has
been implicated by the underlying nature
of the claim. Indeed, the bar for determining whether the nature of a claim is
equitable or legal for Seventh Amendment
purposes is much higher than it is under
Rule 23(b)(2) analysis. Under Seventh
Amendment analysis, the right to a jury
trial must be upheld even if the legal
issues are characterized as "incidental" to
equitable issues.... For this reason,

decisions holding that medical monitoring
claims may be certified under Rule
23(b)(2) are not dispositive for purposes
of the right to a jury trial. In theory and
practice,. courts can certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and yet find that the
parties are entitled to a jury under the
Seventh Amendment.39
The Day court's analysis, however, contradicts the above conclusion in Barnes. According to Day, a request for injunctive relief is
necessary to certify a class under Rule
23(b)(2), therefore, the Barnes court's previous
conclusion that medical monitoring relief is
legal in nature precludes the certification of a
Loyola University Chicago School ofLaw •245

Rule 23(b)(2) class, regardless of other considerations. If, on the other hand, medical monitoring is, in fact, equitable in nature, then the
40
case cannot be placed before a jury.
Under Rule 23(b)(2), a class is mandatory,
or non opt-out. 41 All individuals who fall
within the definition of the class are bound by
any court ruling. 42 Indeed, there is no need for
a class notice to be sent out informing such
class members of their membership in a
class, 43 although failing to notify class members of the existence of a medical monitoring
class would, to be sure, defeat the purpose for
which the class was certified. By contrast, Rule
23(b)(3), the class structure which was established to permit class members to seek primarily money damages, permits class members to
opt-out of the class.' If too many people optout of a medical monitoring class, however, the
class loses its rationale - economies of scale
are lost, together with cost maintenance and
the ability to develop a cohesive strategy for
the medical monitoring of the class as a whole.
Since a Rule 23(b)(2) certification creates
a non opt-out class, both plaintiffs and
defendant's may prefer this certification for
convenience purposes. Convenience, however,
cannot serve as justification for the certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class in medical monitoring cases: as the Barnes court has correctly
determined, medical monitoring is primarily a
legal remedy. The considerations of how a case
can be certified as a class action should not
drive the determination of the nature of the
relief being sought. If medical monitoring is a
legal remedy, however, then plaintiffs run into
a significant, potentially insurmountable,
obstacle on their way to recovery - their
absence of current injury precludes the necessary finding of liability
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IV.Medical Monitoring Suits Must Be
Brought As Product Liability Claims
Thereby Making Recovery Difficult
For Plaintiff's Who Have Not
Suffered Injuries
The sine gua non of a medical monitoring
claim in the context of medical device litigation is that the individual, or group of individuals, has a device which has shown a propensity
to fail in others, but which has not yet failed in
that individual's case, and has therefore not yet
caused any injury. In such a case, the individual is seeking the medical monitoring in
order to prevent or mitigate injury when and if
it occurs. In order to recover for medical
monitoring damages, a plaintiff must establish
the defendant's liability under a product liability theory in order to recover damages against
that defendant. Under most states' product
liability laws, however, a plaintiff who has no
injury cannot, as a matter of law, prove that he
or she has a cause of action against the defendant. In other words, medical expenses are not
themselves injuries - rather, they must be
incurred in connection with an already-existing
compensable injury.45 Accordingly, courts are
reluctant to award a medical monitoring remedy to plaintiffs who have suffered no injury.
The notion that an individual who has a
product which has not yet failed cannot recover
46
against the manufacturer is widely accepted.
In a recent Alabama case, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that regardless of how
a plaintiff pleads, a claim for recovery because
a medical device might someday fail is, in fact,
a product liability claim. Further, a plaintiff
may not evade this result by attempting to
bring a fraud claim rather than a claim for
47
product liability in medical device cases.
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Indeed, the statute of limitations for product
liability claims typically will not begin to run
until after the predicate injury has manifested
48
itself.
The United States Supreme Court recently
reviewed this issue in the context of a Federal
49
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") case.
After a careful analysis of the policy considerations involved, and a recognition that the
courts which have analyzed this question have
come to different conclusions, the Court failed
to find "sufficient support in the common law
for the unqualified rule of lump-sum damages"
that was before it. 50 The Court reached this
conclusion, despite its obvious sympathy for
the plaintiffs, because of its concern over "the
potential systemic effects of creating a new,
full-blown, tort law cause of action - for
example, the effects upon interests of other
potential plaintiffs who are not before the court
and who depend on a tort system that can
distinguish between reliable and serious claims
on the one hand and unreliable and relatively
51
trivial claims on the other."
The Supreme Court's concerns are real and
well-founded. A class-wide medical monitoring program could be a significant expense to a
defendant 52 which should only be incurred
after liability for the design, manufacture and/
or labeling of a defective product has been
established before a jury. Only in this way can
the system prevent abusive suits filed without
proof that a medical device is, in fact, defective. An individual seeking a judicially-imposed medical monitoring program, however,
will almost inevitably not have suffered the
predicate injury necessary to permit recovery
for the damages the individual is seeking.53
Accordingly, there should be no liability for a
medical monitoring program, as a matter of
law in most cases. This does not mean that

1998

individuals with recalled medical devices
54
should not be entitled to medical monitoring,
merely that their chances for recovery through
litigation are so tenuous that their interests are
better served by an industry-based initiative.

V. The doctrine of the separation of
powers creates a conflict between
judicially-imposed medical monitoring and the FDA's regulatory role.
A judicially-ordered medical monitoring
program also raises serious Constitutional and
doctrinal concerns that threaten the success of
any recovery through litigation. In specific, a
court mandated medical monitoring remedy
implicates the fundamental principle of the
separation of powers.
The doctrine of separation of powers is
intended as a safeguard against the encroachment of one branch of the federal government
into the affairs of another branch, or the aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of
another.55 In particular, the judicial branch of
the federal government should neither be
assigned nor allowed tasks that are more
56
properly accomplished by other branches.
Given the FDA's Congressionally-mandated role in the regulation of medical devices,
regardless of the device's marketing status, it is
almost inevitable that it will become involved
in regulatory activity once a device begins to
show problems. 57 Although the FDA has broad
powers, it is likely that at least part of this
regulatory activity will consist of ordering a
recall of the device, if a recall has not been
voluntarily undertaken by the manufacturer. If
the manufacturer has already initiated a recall,
the FDA can demand that recall-related activities continue. Once the FDA becomes involved
in the recall of a medical device, its presence
Loyola University Chicago School ofLaw • 247

creates separation of powers issues for medical
monitoring litigation. Congress has granted the
FDA far-reaching policy making authority and
regulatory power to take whatever steps as are
necessary to protect the public health, and
courts should not attempt to interpose themselves into the FDA's Congressionally-mandated area of expertise and authority.
The FDA is an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services 58 which
is in turn a branch of the Executive branch. 59
Congress has delegated to the FDA, through
the Medical Device Amendments to the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act ("MDA"), the comprehensive authority to regulate the conduct of
medical device manufacturers and to take such
steps as are necessary to protect the public
health in regards to medical devices. As a
result of its Congressional mandate, the FDA
has built up years of experience in dealing with
the medical device industry, making judicial
deference to its actions particularly appropri60
ate.
Of course, before any separation of powers
conflict arises, the FDA must have asserted
itself into a medical device recall. The MDA
grants the FDA jurisdiction to oversee the postmarket surveillance of any medical device
which is permanently implanted into a person,
and may cause serious, adverse health consequences or death if the device fails. 61 The
FDA's involvement is particularly useful during
the early stages of a product recall when a
manufacturer might wish to contact the individuals who use the medical device. Section
51 8(a)of the MDA provides that the FDA can
order direct notification to specific appropriate
third parties, including doctors and patients,
where there is a determination that a medical
device presents an unreasonable risk of substantial harm and that notification may elimi248 - Loyola Consumer Law Review

nate such risk.62 The FDA's review of the

language of these notification letters, and of
the notification letters which are sent out to all
physicians who might come into contact with
patients with the recalled device, is valuable as
a means of ensuring as disinterested and
informative a notice as possible, and again
demonstrates the fairness with which an
industry-based, FDA regulated solution could
be implemented.
Although it would probably be an overstatement to say that the medical device industry welcomes the FDA's involvement in recallrelated activities, such involvement is accepted
by the industry since it is arguably mandated
by statute, and presumably functions for the
benefit of patients who have received medical
devices. The FDA's involvement, however,
creates a Constitutional impediment to patients
who seek a judicially-imposed medical monitoring program. In addition, the FDA's regulation of the recall activities of the device manufacturer could preempt any court-ordered
monitoring activity.
VI.
Regulatory action by the FDA
might preempt state law causes of
action
The preemption doctrine is closely related
to the separation of powers doctrine and can
have the same preclusive effect on a plaintiff's
attempt to impose court-ordered medical
monitoring on a medical device manufacturer.
Although the Supreme Court appeared to have
foreclosed the use of the preemption doctrine
as it pertains to medical devices, there is still
some room for its application in this type of
litigation.
As the Supreme Court has noted, "the
States traditionally have had great latitude
Volume 10, number 3
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under their police powers to legislate as to the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons." 63 Yet the value of the
federal government's power to impose blanket
regulation in many areas has become increasingly important in recent years. "[I]n recent
decades the Federal Government has played an
increasingly significant role in the protection
of the health of our people." 6 In order to
protect these societal advantages, preemption
has become an important element in areas
which are heavily regulated by the federal
government.
The threshold requirement for the application of the preemption doctrine is the intent of
Congress to preempt the field, and there is no
question that Congress intended the MDA to
have at least some preemptive effect. Section
360k(a) of the Act provides that "no State or
political subdivision of a State may establish or
continue in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any requirement (1)
which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this chapter to
the device, and (2) which relates to the safety
or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to
a device under this chapter." Parsing the meaning of this passage, and particularly the meaning of Congress' chosen term "requirement,"
has caused considerable difficulty, however.
The Supreme Court undertook the task of
analyzing the meaning of the MDA, and its
preemptive scope, in 1996. Unfortunately, the
Court's opinion in Medtronic,Inc. v. Lohr left
many questions unanswered. Without becoming mired in a detailed account of the fractured
Lohr opinion and the many possible meanings
the opinion could have, one thing at least is
clear - according to a majority of the Court,
preemption occurs "only where a particular
1998

state requirement threatens to interfere with a
65
specific federal interest.
State requirements must be "with
respect to" medical devices and "different
from, or in addition to" federal requirements. State requirements must also relate
"to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device," and
the regulations provide that state requirements "of general applicability" are not
pre-empted except where they have "the
effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device." Moreover, federal requirements must be "applicable to the device" in question and,
according to the regulations, pre-empt
state law only if they are "specific counterpart regulations" or "specific" to a
"particular device." The statute and
regulations, therefore, require a careful
comparison between the allegedly preempting federal requirement and the
allegedly pre-empted state requirement to
determine whether they fall within the
intended pre-emptive scope of the statute
66
and the regulations.
The Lohr opinion analyzed the preemptive
effect of the MDA in connection with the
process by which medical device manufacturers receive permission to market their products.
The Court's analysis, however, is equally
applicable in the medical monitoring context.
When the FDA has imposed itself into the
recall of a specific medical device, and has
issued orders regarding the conduct of the
recall of that device, it has imposed requirements which are device-specific onto a manufacturer. Any attempt to impose a court-ordered medical monitoring program, therefore,
is an attempt to impose requirements prediLoyola University Chicago School of Law • 249

cated upon state law which are "with respect"
to a specific device, and are "different from or
in addition to" those requirements imposed by
the FDA. Accordingly, once the FDA begins
the regulation of a medical device recall, courtimposed medical monitoring is preempted, and
continues to be preempted as long as the FDA
is regulating the recall.
This result, which comports with the FDA's
own narrow view of the preemptive effect of its
activities, 67 is particularly desirable when the
possibility of conflicting requirements is
considered. Where a court-imposed medical
monitoring program co-exists with a recall
program being regulated by the FDA, it is
entirely possible for a manufacturer to be
required to, for example, provide certain
information to doctors or patients by the court,
yet be prohibited from providing such information by the FDA. To the extent that recall and
monitoring activities could be coordinated in
order to prevent such conflicts would negate
the need for two programs because one would
68
merely be duplicating the efforts of the other.
In such a case, no physician would order the
second, court-imposed, medical monitoring
program. Medical or scientific necessity is one
of the fundamental pillars of medical monitoring relief. Although it can be argued that
judicially-imposed medical monitoring is
necessary in order to mandate compliance, this
argument ignores the teeth carried by the
MDA, in the form of civil and criminal penal69
ties for failure to comply with an FDA order.
Thus, the FDA has the mandate to involve
itself in the recall of medical devices, the
power to regulate the activities of a manufacturer when such a device specific recall is
initiated, either voluntarily by the manufacturer
or under FDA orders, and has the power to
enforce its regulations. Under these circum250

*

Loyola Consumer Law Review

stances, and in light of Lohr, it is difficult to
conclude that litigation-based medical monitoring, sought under the application of State law,
is not preempted by the FDA's device-specific
regulation.

VII. Conclusion
The medical monitoring of patients with a
defective medical device should be conducted
with the best interests of the patients in mind.
Patients with defective medical devices should
receive an analysis of data surrounding their
problem, recommendations regarding clinical
management of the problem, and reimbursement of expenses associated with diagnostic
and therapeutic treatment as early as possible.
Not only are there serious, if not insurmountable, legal obstacles to obtaining judiciallyimposed medical monitoring, such legally
obtained relief does not inure to the benefit of
the plaintiffs. The interests of patients are best
served by a voluntary program initiated by the
manufacturer with regulatory oversight from
the FDA. In this way, a plan for the clinical
management of the problem can be developed
as efficiently, quickly, and inexpensively as
possible, without the significant transaction
costs associated with litigation-based medical
monitoring, a form of relief which, in any case,
might not be available to prospective litigants.

Endnotes
The term "device" is defined in § 32 1(h) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 as "an
instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related
2
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article, including any component, part, or accessory,
which is (1) recognized in the official National Formulary or the U.S. Pharmacopoeia or any supplement to
them, (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or
other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3)
intended to affect the structure of any function of the
human body or bodies of other animals, and which does
not achieve any of its principal intended purposes
through chemical action within or on the body of man or
other animals and which is not dependent upon being
metabolized for the achievement of any of its primary
intended purposes." 21 U.S.C. § 32 1(h).
According to the Health Industry Manufacturers Association ("HIMA"), U.S. production of medical
devices and diagnostic products reached $61.2 billion in
1996 and was projected to reach $71.4 billion in 1998.
Medical device exports accounted for $12.9 billion in
1996 and imports amounted to $6.4 billion. The U.S.
medical device industry employed 280,760 people in
1996. HIMA projects industry growth for 1998 as
follows: market size up 7%; production up 8%; exports
up 9%; imports up 6%; trade surplus up 17%; and
employment up 2%. HIMA U.S. MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY FACT SHEET (1996).
3

4
The body is a hostile environment for engineered devices, with numerous anticipated and unanticipated strains placed on any device by the motion of the
body as well as the body's natural defenses to foreign
objects. Taking the artificial components of a pacemaker
system as an example, physicians have concluded that
"All components of the pacemaker system.., have
continued to have reportable failures.... These findings

were observed for all five of the leading manufacturers.
We conclude, therefore, that despite technological
advances, formal monitoring of permanent pacemaker
systems continues to be necessary on the basis of such
evidence of continuing device imperfections." David T.
Kawanishi, et. al. FailureRates of Leads, Pulse Generators, and ProgrammersHave Not DiminishedOver the
Last 20 Years: FormalMonitoringof Performance is Still
Needed, 19 PACING AND CARDIAC ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY ("PACE") 1819 (1996).
The U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO"), in a
1992 study of the performance of implantable pacemaker leads noted that a 7% failure rate appears to be
the trigger percentage for regulatory action on previ-

1998

ously recalled or safety-alerted leads, although the report
also notes that some experts believe that the number
should be somewhere between 1% and 5%. U.S. General
Accounting Office, Medical Technology: ForSome
CardiacPacemakerLeads, the PublicHealth Risks Are
Still High, GAO/PEMD-92-20, Sept. 1992, ("GAO
Report") at 14-15.
5

See 21 U.S.C.S § 360i (1997).

A medical device "recall" can be defined as
"the removal from the market of a particular product,
correction of a marketed product, or correction of a
marketed product, or correction of labeling or of
promotional material that FDA considers in violation of
the laws if administers. FDA has designated three
classes of recall in descending order of the potential
degree of health risk from class I to class III." GAO
Report at 48(citation omitted).
6

7

See 21 U.S.C. § 360a(e)

The failure of several different medical devices
has resulted in litigation. See, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer,
143 ER.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (dealing with the
fracturing of heart valves); In re Cordis Corp. Pacemaker Product Liability Litigation, MDL 850 (S.D. Ohio
1992) (dealing with defective pacemakers); Rall v.
Medtronic, Inc. 1986 WL 22271 (D. Nev. 1986) (dealing
with defective pacemaker leads); Spitzfadden v. Dow
Coming Corp., No. 97-1011 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2/11/98)
(dealing with breast implants); In re Am. Med. Sys. Inc.,
75 E3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1996) (dealing with penile
implants).
8

See Ayres v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d
287 (N.J. 1987). The Court held that "the cost of medical
surveillance is a compensable item of damages where
the proofs demonstrate, through reliable expert testimony predicated upon the significance and extent of
exposure to chemicals, the toxicity of the chemicals, the
seriousness of the diseases for which individuals are at
risk, the relative increase in the chance of onset of
disease in those exposed, and the value of early diagnosis, that such surveillance to monitor the effect of
exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonably necessary." Id.
at 312.
9

10

See Friends For All Children v. Lockheed
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Aircraft Corp., 746 E2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (granting a
preliminary injunction which required defendant to
create a fund to pay for diagnostic examinations). But
see, Reed v. Phillip Morris Inc., No. 96-5060, slip op. at
35 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 1997) (holding that medical
monitoring is a compensable element of damages, not a
cause of action).
I
Class actions are typically sought in federal
court pursuant to one of the subdivisions of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23. This paper will only analyze class questions in
terms of the federal rules. Traditionally, federal courts
have been receptive to the class action device making
federal courts the forum of choice in medical monitoring
litigation. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co, v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (holding that it is unconstitutional
for forum state to apply its own substantive law in
nationwide class action to claims of class members
residing in other states unless forum state has legitimate
state interest in each such claim).
However, federal courts have become increasingly
less receptive to class actions. See, e.g., Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (1997);
Valentino v. Carter Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 ( 9 th Cir.
1996); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 E3d 734
(5th Cir. 1996); In re American Medical Systems, Inc.,
75 E3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Matter of Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 ( 7th Cir. 1995) (all rejecting
class certification of mass products liability litigation).
But see, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,
116 S.Ct. 873 (1996) (holding that state class action
judgments are entitled to full faith and credit, even
though they resolve claims which are exclusively federal
and could not have been brought in state court). Accordingly, it is unclear whether, in the future, state law
medical monitoring class actions may assume greater
importance than they have until now.
12
Class certification is only efficient, however,
when a mandatory class can be certified. The certification of a medical monitoring class under the provisions
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), which permits class members
to opt-out of the class and pursue individual remedies,
would be counter-productive, as opting-out of unified
relief would detract from any efficiency gained by class
certification.
13

The attorney's fees which can be generated

from a settlement involving medical monitoring class
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certification are not insubstantial and can be the source
of collateral litigation. See, e.g., Bowling, 132 F.3d 1147
(1998) (requiring defendants to pay $75 million into a
Patient Benefit Fund, $80 to $130 million into a Medical
and Psychological Consultation Fund (the final amount
depending on the number of claims), and $500,000 to $2
million for each U.S. claimant into the Fracture Compensation Mechanism)
14
This paper is limited to a discussion of the
medical monitoring issue in the context of medical
device litigation. It takes no position on the propriety of
medical monitoring relief in the area of toxic exposure.

is

See Day v. NLO, 851 FSupp 869, 881

16
See id. at 881 (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993)).
17
The potential costs are considerable. The GAO
Report, for example, observed that 86% of pacemaker
recipients are elderly and eligible for Medicare coverage
for pacemaker-related procedures. "If a lead fails, there
are two types of expense: the replacement operation and
additional transtelephonic monitoring of patients who
did not receive a replacement lead.... We estimate that
the minimum total cost beyond routine Medicare
coverage for all five models [analyzed in the survey]
would be $50 million; this would rise to $56 million if
another potentially problematic model were found to
experience significantly high failure rates" GAO Report
at 15. The cost model, assumptions, and findings of the
cost model upon which the GAO Report is based can be
found at Appendix V of the GAO Report.
18

See Day, 851 ESupp at 881.

19

A medical device manufacturer faces almost

certain national, and potentially international litigation
as soon as a medical device is recalled. Such litigation
often includes a punitive damages component. In
addition, a manufacturer who has failed to meet its
obligation under the MDA is subject to civil and
criminal penalties. If the prospect of these punishments
is insufficient to deter the manufacturer from acting
negligently, court-ordered medical monitoring will
unlikely be of any additional threat.
20
Bernard S. Goldman et. al, Managementof
Intracardiac Device Recalls: A Consensus Conference,
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19 PACE 7 (1996).

(6)
21

Id. at 9.

22

Id. at 10.

23

U.S. Const. amend. VII.

24

See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local

No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990) (quoting
Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830)).

(7)

Id. (quoting Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department
of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145-46 (Pa. 1997).
31

25

See Barnes, 989 ESupp. at 662.

See, e.g., Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359

U.S. 500, 501 (1959), the court held that "Maintenance
of the jury as a fact finding body is of such importance
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury
trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care"(citations omitted); See also, Matter of RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 E3d 1293 ( 7 th Cir. 1995), the
court held that "The protection of the right conferred by
the Seventh Amendment to trial by jury in federal civil
cases is a traditional office of the writ of mandamus....
When the writ is used for that purpose, strict compliance
with the stringent conditions on the availability of the
writ (including the requirement of proving irreparable
harm) is excused." (citations omitted).
26

See Terry, 494 U.S. at 565.

27

See id.

28

See Barnes v. the Am. Tobacco Co., 989

F.Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1997), appealdocketed, No. 971844 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 1997).
29

See id.

30

See id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held

that the elements of a common law claim for medical
monitoring are:
(1) exposure greater than normal background
levels;
(2)
to a proven hazardous substance;
caused by the defendant's negligence;
(3)
(4) as a proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff
has a significantly increased risk of contracting
a serious latent disease;
a monitoring procedure exists that makes the
(5)
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early detection of the disease possible;
the prescribed monitoring regime is different
from that normally recommended in the
absence of the exposure; and
the prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably
necessary according to contemporary scientific
principles.

See id. at 663. The Barnes court failed to refer
to state law for information regarding the nature of
medical monitoring claims. Several states have concluded that medical monitoring is an element of legal
damages, to be recovered after liability is established
under an underlying tort theory such as negligence or
strict liability. See, e.g., Fleming v. Knowles, 130 So. 2d
326 (Ala. 1961); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752
P.2d 28 (Ariz. 1988); Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co. 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Riche v. City of Baton
Rouge, 541 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 1988); Thomas v. Fay
Bearing Corp., Inc., 846 ESupp. 1400 (W.D.Mo. 1994);
Ball v. Joy Mfg., 755 ESupp. 1344, (S.D.W.Va. 1990).
New Jersey, by contrast, has concluded that medical
monitoring relief is equitable in nature. See Ayres, 525
A.2d at 314. "In our view, the use of a court-supervised
fund to administer medical surveillance payments in
32

mass-exposure cases.... is a highly appropriate exercise

of the Court's equitable powers'" See id.Compare
Redland Soccer, 696 A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997) (approving of
medical monitoring relief, but outlining a series of
elements which plaintiffs must prove in order to prevail
on what it termed a "common law claim for medical
monitoring." See id. at 145. The differences between
state laws on this issue, at the least, make class certification of a medical monitoring claim inappropriate.
33

See Barnes,989 F.Supp. at 665.

34

Day,144 ER.D.at 335-36.

35

See id.

36

See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374 (1992).
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See Barnes, 989 F.Supp. at 666. The court's
conclusion was strengthened by the policy considerations underlying the principle that equitable relief
should only be available where there is no adequate legal
remedy. The Supreme Court has held that the purpose of
this provision is "to guard the right of trial by jury
preserved by the Seventh Amendment and to that end [it]
should be liberally construed." Ross v. Berhard, 396 U.S.
531, 539 (1970)(citation omitted).
37

Fed. R. Civ. P.23(b)(2) provides as follows:
"An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition: (2) the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole... "
38

39

Barnes, 989 FSupp. at 666 (citations omitted).

40
The Barnes court noted that other courts had
"repeatedly" sent medical monitoring claims to the jury.

See Barnes, 989 F.Supp. at 667, citing In re Paoli R.R.
Yard Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994); See, e.g., In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990);
Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.
1986); Day v. NLO 851 F.Supp. 869 (S.D.Ohio 1994).
The Barnes court observed, however, that these courts
did not directly examine the issue. At least one court
declined to certify a mandatory medical monitoring
class which was sought in conjunction with the largest
class ever certified. "Certification of the medical
monitoring class in this case under Rule 23(b)(2) would
infringe on the constitutional right to a jury trial, The
Court cannot and will not infringe on that inviolate
right." Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.RD.
544, 552 (E.D.La. 1995). One potential solution to this
conflict is to impanel a jury for all issues of law and
impanel the same jury as an advisory jury pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c), which provides that "[i]n all actions
not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of
its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury
or, except in actions against the United States when a
statute of the United States provides for trial without a
jury... may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has
the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of
right." Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
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41
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) provides, in pertinent
part, as follows: "The judgment in an action maintained
as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
describe those whom the court finds to be members of
the class." By contrast, the remainder of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(3) provides that "[t]he judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in
subdivision (c)( 2 ) was directed, and who have not
requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members of the class."
42

Although the Rule would appear to be clear on

this point, it is true that some courts have permitted optouts in supposedly mandatory, or non opt-out, (b)(1) or
(b)(2) class actions. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Billington, 110
F.3d 87, 94 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (finding that "[T]he language of Rule 23 is sufficiently flexible to afford district
courts discretion to grant opt-out rights in (b)(1) and
(b)(2) class actions.") citing Crawford v. Honig, 37 E3d
485 (9t ' Cir. 1995); County of Suffolk v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 907 F2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); Williams v.
Burlington Northern Inc., 832 F.2d 100 ( 7th Cir. 1987);
Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F2d 1144 (11t1 Cir.
1983); Penson v. Terminal Transport Co., 634 F2d 989
(5th Cir. 1981).
Fed. R. Civ. . 23(c)2) provides, in pertinent
part, as follows: "In any class action maintained under
subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members
of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort. When a class
is certified, however, all class members are entitled to
notice. Rule 23(e) provides that "[a] class action shall
not be dismissed or compromised without the approval
of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in
such manner as the court directs." Accordingly, when a
medical monitoring class is certified pursuant to
settlement, all class members will be notified in the best
manner practicable under the circumstances.
43

44

See supra note 40.

See, e.g., Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc.,
1997 WL 728529 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming trial
45
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court's holding that medical monitoring damages could
not be recovered where plaintiffs failed to allege present
injury).
See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian, 682 So.2d 405,
408 (Ala. 1996); Walus v. Pfizer, Inc., 812 ESupp. 41,
44-45 (D.N.J. 1993); Angus v. Shiley, Inc., 989 F.2d 142
(3 'd Cir. 1993); Murphy v. Shiley, Inc., 940 F.2d 668, text
in 1991 W L 135505 ( 9th Cir. 1991); Willett v. Baxter
Int'l, Inc., 929 F.2d 1094, 1099 (5"h Cir. 1991);
Lauterbach v. ShileyInc., 1991 WL 148137 *4
(S.D.Tex. Mar. 29, 1991) Pryor v. Shiley, Inc., 916 E2d
716, text in 1990 WL 159582 *3 (9th Cir. 1990); Spuhl v.
Shiley, Inc., 795 S.W2d 573, 580 (Mo. Ct. App.); Sill v.
Shiley, Inc., 735 F.Supp. 337, 340 (WD.Mo. 1989);
Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc., 732 F.Supp. 33, 35 (M.D.Pa.
1989); Kent v. Shiley, Inc., 1989 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 8962,
*4-5 (D.Or. Jan. 23, 1989); O'Brien v. Medtronic Inc.,
439 N.W2d 151 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) Taylor v.
Medtronic, Inc., 861 F2d 980, 988 (6 th Cir. 1988);
Hagepanos v. Shiley, Inc., 846 F.2d 71, text in 1988 WL
35752 *1-2 (4th Cir. 1988);
46

47
See Farsian,682 So. at 407. Alabama has
passed a product liability statute that subsumes within it
claims of negligence and strict liability. The Farsian
court concluded that regardless of how a plaintiff pleads
the claim, a claim for recovery because a medical device
might someday fail is, in fact, a product liability/
personal injury claim. "Alabama courts have never
allowed a recovery based on a product that.., is and has
been working properly." Id.

See, e.g., Cacciacarne v. G.D. Searle & Co., 908
F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1990). If this rule were otherwise, it
would create the impossible situation of a plaintiff being
required to file suit without any evidence that a malfunction in the medical device had, or might, occur, in order
to avoid a potential barring of the litigation if the device
malfunctioned after the running of the applicable statute
of limitations.
48

See Metro-North Commuter R.R Co. v.
Buckley, 117 S.Ct. 2113, 2115-16 (1997). Although this
case involved FELA, the Court observed that it had
found no other FELA decisions on this issue, and
instead based its decision on its canvassing of state law
cases "that have considered whether the negligent
causation of this kind of harm ...by itself constitutes a
49
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sufficient basis for a tort recovery." Id at 2122.
50

See id. at 2124.

51

Id.

Such programs are certainly expensive in the
aggregate. Whether, on the other hand, a medical
monitoring program when viewed as an expense per
individual would be particularly expensive is another
issue. This has implications for federal suits filed under
the federal courts diversity jurisdiction. The jurisdictional amount in controversy for diversity cases is now
$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Whether each class
member would be able to make a claim for individual
medical monitoring in a particular case is an issue which
would require careful scrutiny on a case-by-case basis.
Class members may not aggregate their claims in order
to meet the jurisdictional amount. See Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969). This same rule applies in class
certification claims for injunctive relief brought under
Rule 23(b)(2). Pierson v. Source Perrier, S.A., 848
F.Supp. 1186, 1188 (E.D.Pa. 1994); Smiley v. Citibank
(South Dakota), N.A., 863 F.Supp. 1156, 1163 (C.D.Cal.
1993). Each representative plaintiff in a class suit must
meet the jurisdictional amount set by Congress. The
force of the Supreme Court's opinion in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) has been somewhat undermined by the careless drafting of the language of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The drafters of this Act,
by error, omitted Rule 23 from the list of Rules of Civil
Procedure unaffected by the portion of the Act which
provides for supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within
the court's original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy. (For more surrounding the
drafting of the 1990 Act see, Thomas C. Arthur &
Richard D. Freer, Close Enough For Government Work:
What Happens When Congress Doesn'tDo Its Job, 40
EMORY L.J. 1007 (199 1)(describing the Act as a
"nightmare of draftsmanship")).
Even though the 1990 Act throws some of the
Court's holding in Zahn into, at best, a state of confusion, the Court's holding that each representative
plaintiff in a class suit must meet the jurisdictional
amount is undiminished. See also, In re Abbott Laboratories, 51 F3d 524, 526-27 (5t ' Cir. 1995). This holding
is particularly significant in cases involving medical
52
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monitoring, where there is, or should be, no deviation
between the relief sought by the representative and the
other, passive, members of the class.
53
In some cases, courts have found that no
physical injury is necessary in order to seek medical
monitoring relief. See, e.g., Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., Inc., 876 ESupp. 475 (W.D.N.Y 1995);
Bocook v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 819 FSupp. 531 (S.D.WVa.
1993). Moreover, in the case often cited as the herald of
product liability based medical monitoring programs Friendsfor all Children,Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
- the plaintiffs had suffered physical trauma as a result
of a plane crash in which they were passengers. See also,
Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc. 788 E2d 315,
modified, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986); Simmons v.
Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996) (in both cases
plaintiffs suffered traumatic impact). For this reason
alone, these cases are distinguishable from the paradigmatic medical monitoring situation presented by medical
device litigation.

54

See infra section I.

55

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).

56

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680-81

(1988).
57
Although FDA has not indicated a threshold of
device failures, the GAO observed, based on the
regulatory action that the FDA had taken on recalled
pacemaker leads, that a minimum failure level of 7%
appeared to be the trigger percentage for regulatory
action. See supra note 3 at 14..
58

See 21 U.S.C. § 393(a).

59

See 5 U.S.C. § 101.

60
See, e.g., United States v. 9/1 KG. Containers,
854 E2d 173, 176 (7t Cir. 1988) (finding that the phrase
"necessary for the public health" in the FDCA requires
the FDA "to make a judgment where the public interest
lies," and courts must defer to the FDA when it is acting
pursuant to its statutory mandate;) Washington, Dept. of
Ecology v. United States Envt'l Protection Agency, 752
F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that Judicial
deference to agency action is particularly appropriate
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where a full understanding of the force of statutory
policy in a given situation depends upon "more than
ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
the agency regulations.") (citations omitted).
61

See 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a).

62

Section 518(a) of the MDA has been codified

as 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a).
63 62 See Medtronic. Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240,
2245 (1996) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)).
64

Id. at 2245.

65

See id. at 2257.

66

Id at 2257

The FDA is understandably, and properly,
concerned about having broad preemptive powers. The
present regulation pertaining to this issue provides, in
pertinent part, that "[s]tate or local regulations are
preempted only when the Food and Drug Administration
has established specific counterpart regulations or there
are other specific requirements applicable to a particular
device under the act, thereby making any existing
divergent State or local requirements applicable to the
device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food
and Drug Administration requirements." 21 C.ER_ §
808. 1(d). The preemption of medical monitoring relief
once the FDA has become involved in the regulation of a
device recall is entirely consistent with the FDA's
position in this regulation.
67

68
Judicially-imposed medical monitoring
program would carry with it heavy transaction costs in
the form of attorney's fees whereas the FDA-regulated
recall would not, thus making such parallel programs
unnecessary.
69
Section 301q(l)(a) of the MDA provides
statutory authority for the imposition of civil and
criminal penalties for non-compliance with FDA
requirements.
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